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COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN OKLAHOMA
A. W. TRICE*
ALTHOUGH the geographical division now comprising the
_ State of Oklahoma was included in the Louisiana Purchase
and was at various times previously claimed by or under the nomi-
nal rulership of Spain and France, neither of those nations effected
any permanent settlements there nor established its system of laws
in that territory. The Community Property system is not, therefore,
indigenous to the Oklahoma legal structure but is alien.1 The
impact of rapidly rising Federal income and estate tax rates per-
suaded the Oklahoma Legislature in 1939 to attempt a novel ex-
periment in an effort to afford to its citizens the tax advantages,
federalwise, of their neighbors of Texas and New Mexico.
By H. B. 565, approved May 10, 1939, effective July 29, 1939,2
there was instituted an elective or optional system of community
property for the citizens of Oklahoma. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act
provided for the execution of a voluntary written election by hus-
band and wife to establish community ownership as an incident
of their marital relationship to continue until dissolved by death
or divorce. These two sections further provided for the filing of
such written elections in the offices of the Secretary of State and
of the County Clerk of the county of residence of the spouses. The
remaining sections 3 to 15 embodied and defined the community
property system to exist between the electing spouses and their
respective rights, ownerships and obligations thereunder. The Act
established a complete system of community property and appears
*Partner, firm of Busby, Harrell and Trice, Ada, Oklahoma; President of the Okla-
homa Bar Association, 1944; Member of the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association.
1 Pridemore v. Duncan, 146 Okla. 70, 293 Pac. 266 (1930) ; Com. Int. Rev. v. Har-
mon, 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, 89 L Ed. 649 (1944).
2 S. L. 1939, p. 356, 32 OKLA. STATS., 51-65.
[€oL 1
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN OKLAHOMA
uncommonly well drawn. Without material change the Act was
adopted and passed by the Legislature of Oregon.3
Both the State and Federal taxing authorities refused recogni-
tion of the communities established under the Act of 1939 and
appeals were taken to the courts. The Oklahoma Tax Commission
contended among others that the Act was in conflict with certain
provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. That contention was
denied by the Supreme Court of the State and the Act was held
valid largely upon the basis that the communities established under
it were voluntary and contractual."
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue was more successful.
His refusal of recognition was based upon the distinction between
the conventional or consensual communities established under the
Act and the involuntary or legal communities imposed on spouses
by the statutes and constitutions of the recognized community prop-
erty states. The Tax Court refused this distinction. The Commis-
sioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit where the Tax Court was affirmed. On his further appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, the Commissioner's contention
was sustained and the lower courts reversed.5
The Supreme Court denied rehearing in the case on December
18, 1944, and the Oklahoma Legislature in its 1945 session passed
H. B. 218,6 instituting the Community Property system as an in-
voluntary incident of marriage between citizens of the state. The
Act was signed by the Governor and became effective July 26,
1945. Sections 1 to 15, inclusive, set up the structure of community
property and with some slight changes were identical with Sections
3 to 15 of the Act of 1939. Section 16 of the new Act repealed
the Act of 1939 and Section 18 provided that the provisions of the
new Act should apply to and govern the property rights of spouses
who had elected under the former Act.
3 Ore. Laws of 1943, Ch. 440, p. 456, ORE. COMP. LAWS. ANN., Title 63, Ch. 2a.
4 Harmon v. Okla. Tax. Com., 189 Okla. 475, 118 P. (2d) 205 (1941).
5 Harmon v. Com. Int. Rev., 1 T. C. 40 (1943) ; C. I. T. v. Harmon, 139 F. (2d) 211
(C. C. A. 10th, 1943) rev. 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, 89 L. ed. 649 (1944).
6 S. L. 1945, p. 118, 32 OKLA. STATS., 66-82.
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An application was made to the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue in the name of the Governor of the State for a ruling on the
new Act and recognition for Federal tax purposes of the com-
munity estates and ownerhips thereby created. The Commissioner
held that recognition must be given to the communities so estab-
lished and spouses domiciled in Oklahoma permitted to return
their incomes accordingly.7 The State Tax Authorities recognized
the new Act as effective without protest.
Following the ruling of the Commissioner various other states
enacted involuntary Community Property systems in Acts identi-
cal with or closely patterned after the Oklahoma Act.' Of these the
Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska and Oklahoma Acts have been re-
pealed and the Pennsylvania Act was declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court of that state.9
The repealer of the Oklahoma Act contains in addition to the
repeal certain provisions in section 2 designed to erase property
rights acquired under the community property system by preclud-
ing their assertion as against third parties and as against the com-
munity partner after the lapse of a specified time unless certain
positive steps be taken to preserve them. These provisions raise
a number of interesting constitutional questions, a discussion of
which follows.
In considering them it must be first noted that two different
groups of spouses are affected: First, those spouses who elected
to establish a community under the Act of July 29, 1939; and sec-
ond, those who did not so elect and for whom a community was
first established by the Act of 1945.
As to the first group their election constituted a contract be-
tween them to the effect that their future rights and interests in
I. T. 3782, 1946.1 C. B. 84.
s Hawaii Revised Laws, 1945, Ch. 301 A; Michigan S. L. 1947, Pub. Act 317, Stats.
Ann. § 26.216 (17-261216(20) ; Nebraska, S. L. 1947, Leg. Bill No. 140; Oregon, Laws of
1947, Ch. 525, Comp. Laws, Ann., Title 63, Ch. 2b; Pennsylvania, Act. No. 550, 1947
Session.
" Okla. H. B. 13, 1949 S. L., p. 229; Neb. S. L. 1949, Leg. Bill 13; Mich. Public Act
No. 39, May 10, 1948; Willcox v. The Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 At. (2d) 521 (Pa.
S. Ct. 1947).
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income and property should be determined by the Act of 1939.
Their community arises out of contract and is consensual or con-
ventional."0
It is a familiar and fundamental rule of constitutional law that
a statute under which a contract is made enters into and becomes
a part of the contract and that the Legislature has no power to alter
the terms of the contract or the duties and rights arising therefrom
by a subsequent amendment or repeal of the statute."
Although the Act of 1939 was repealed in 1945 in the enactment
of the Community Property Act of that year, it is doubtful under
the rule stated whether that repeal could in any way affect or
change the contractual relationship existing between husband and
wife and created under the provisions of the Act of 1939. In this
connection, the Act of 1945 was not identical in language with the
preceding Act. Under the Act of 1939 "increase" of lands owned
as separate property was declared to be separate property also.
The Act of 1945 did not so provide. Gifts of a wife's interest in
community property to the husband was declared by the 1939 Act
to be separate property of the husband. This provision does not
appear in the 1945 Act.
Several of the community property states have at various times
endeavored to change the character of marital property from com-
munity to separate or vice versa. These attempts insofar as they
were intended to operate retrospectively have been uniformly de-
clared unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due
process of law.'"
It is probable that the appeal of the Act of 1939 by the Act of
1945 did not affect or alter the agreement between electing spouses
10 Comm. of Int. Rev. v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44, 46-47, 89 L. ed. 60, 62-63 (1944);
Harmon v. Okla. Tax Comm., 189 Okla. 475, 118 P. (2d) 205 (1941).
11 U. S. CONST., Art. 1, § 10; Amend. 14, § 1; OKLA. CONST., Art. 2, § 15; Baker v.
Tulsa Bldg. & Loan Assn., 179 Okla. 432, 66 P. (2d) 45 (1936); Carondelet Canal &
Nay. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed. 1001 (1913); Home Building & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. ed. 413, 88 A. L. R. 1481 (1933) ; Northern P. R.
Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630 (1907).




and that their rights and duties inter se continue to be controlled
by the Act of 1939.
Section One of the Act of 1949 repeals "Title 32, Chapter I,"s
relating to Community Property." Section 2 provides for certain
agreements by "any husband and wife whose property or income
was subject to the terms of the Act repealed" and for actions and
a limitation on actions "to establish or recover an interest in
property based upon the terms of the Act repealed." It would thus
appear that the Act of 1949 relates only to the involuntary com-
munities arising as incidents of the marital relationship and estab-
lished by the Act of 1945. In such case the consensual communi-
ties created by mutual agreements under the Act of 1939 would be
unaffected.
It is clear that if the Act of 1949 does affect the consensual
communities it will dissolve them and terminate the whole struc-
ture of rights and duties granted and assumed by the spouses.
These, being creatures of contract, will have been not only im-
paired but actually destroyed, an effect which, under present
constitutional views, the Legislature is without power to produce.
With relation to the second group, those upon whom the com-
munity property system was imposed by the Act of 1945, the mat-
ter of impairment of contract is not involved. The power of the
Legislature to alter the incidents of matrimony and of the marital
relationship is not subject to constitutional limitations except, un-
der the Oklahoma Constitution, polygamy may not be legalized,
and the Legislature may not dissolve by law a particular mar-
riage."
Whether the Legislature may alter the incidents of marriage so
as to impair or destroy vested rights of property is the question
involved here. As to the prospective operation of the repeal, it
seems clear from the authorities that the action of the Legislature
13 Session Laws 1945 (32 0. S. Supp. 1947, §§ 66-82, inclusive).
14 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654 (1887) ; Dartmouth College v. Wood.
ward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629 (1819) ; 12 AM. JUR. 47, § 416; OKLA. CONST., Art. 1,
§ 2. Art. 5. § 46.
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is a valid exercise of constitutional authority. It is the effect of the
Act on property or interests in property vested in individual
spouses on the date of the passage of the Act, which must be most
carefully considered.
The draftsmen of the Act sought to avoid this constitutional
question by providing (1) for a species of notice to third persons
of claims of community interest, and (2) by a limitation upon
actions to establish or recover such interest. The act thus places
upon the owner of an interest in community property title to which
stands in the name of the other spouse additional conditions and
burdens in order to preserve his vested rights in the property. The
authorities are not in agreement on the power of the Legislature
to impose such additional conditions and burdens. It has been
held that the repeal of a law which constitutes a contract is an im-
pairment of its obligations. Also, a statute which alters the terms
of a contract by imposing new conditions or adding new duties may
be within the constitutional inhibition.15 On the contrary it has been
held that the state may impose added conditions or duties on in-
dividuals with regard to their contracts, such as requiring the
recording of them or publication notice in order to preserve the
rights of the parties.'" However, the rights of the second group,
the non-consensual communities, do not arise from contract but
are solely creatures of the statute,17 and the prospective alteration
of the property status of those spouses inter se is under the authori-
ties within the legislative power.
The vested property rights of the spouses arising under the Act
of 1945 are not, by the terms of the repeal, destroyed; the repeal
only requires that the parties take steps for the preservation of
those vested rights and that they give notice to third persons.
15 12 AM. JUR. 19, § 389; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 591, 52 L.
ed. 630, 634 (1907).
10 12 C. J. 1058, § 704; Kansas Farmers Union Royalty Co. v. Henshaw, 149 Kan. 64,
86 P. (2d) 559 (1939).
17 Williams v. Pipe Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851, 50 L. R. A. 816 (1900);
Fort Worth & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 121 S. W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909); 131
S. W. 400 (1910); Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 213; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Har-
mon, supra, note 1.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
It has been held that community property rights existing at the
time and place of the marriage cannot be taken away by subsequent
legislation and are not affected by the repeal of the law under
which they were acquired."8
Insofar as the statute is one of limitation it seems clearly within
the legislative power.'9
And the provision for recording notice of claim of interest under
authorities of weight does not violate the due process provision."0
As previously indicated the authorities are not uniform on the
constitutionality, validity and effect of the repealing statute insofar
as the community relationships established under the 1945 Act
are concerned. It has been held in numerous cases that a Legisla-
ture may not transfer a vested right of property from one person
to another, directly or through the device of cutting down a vested
ownership to a mere right of action which will be lost unless as-
serted within a specified time. These decisions are based upon a
number of constitutional provisions, including due process of law.2
There are many possible and probable sets of circumstances
which may arise under the Oklahoma repealer wherein the vested
interest in the community of one of the spouses will be taken from
him or her without that spouse's consent, for it has been held that
a constructive consent may not be imposed simply on the basis of
a failure to comply with the statute.22
is Pritchard v. Citizens Bank, 8 La. 130, 28 Am. Dec. 132 (1835) ; Dixon v. Dixon,
4 La. 188, 23 Am. Dec. 478 (1832).
1" Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 255, 34 L. ed. 659 (1890) ; Mattson v. Dept. of Labor
& Industries of the State of Washington, 293 U. S. 151, 79 L. ed. 251 (1934) ; Kansas
Farmers Union Royalty Co. v. Henshaw, 149 Kan. 64, 86 P. (2d) 559 (1939), appeal
dismissed, 307 U. S. 615, 83 L. ed. 1496 (1938), rehearing denied, 308 U. S. 364, 84 L. ed.
527 (1939).
20 Moore v. Chalmers, 10 P. (2d) 950 (S. Ct. Colo., 1932) ; Hoofman v. Milwaukee
Elec. R., 106 N. W. 808 (S. Ct. Wis., 1906); Kansas Farmers Union Royalty Co. v. Hen.
shaw, supra, note 14.
21 Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480 (1865) Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (1865)
Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038 (1883) ; Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 19
So. (2d) 815 (1944), 20 So. (2d) 821 (1945); Buty v. Goldfinch, 74 Wash. 532, 133 Pac.
1057, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1065, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 604 (1913); Murrison v. Fenster-
macher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P. (2d) 160 (1949).
22 In re Thornton's Estate, supra, note 12; Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480 (1865).
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Both as a practical matter and in conformity with well recog-
nized rules of constitutional construction it is anticipated that the
courts of the state will sustain the repealing act insofar as the
involuntary communities are concerned. However, numerous prob-
lems, both legal and practical may arise in its application. It would
appear that the repeal of the Oklahoma Community Property Act
may not effectually terminate the rights and claims of the members
of the community and their successors in interest, and that, on the
contrary, it will require more than one decision of the courts of
last resort finally to resolve the uncertainties which the repeal has
created.
